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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD ON APPEAL, SOUND PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, DICTATE THAT THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT TRESPASSERS ARE 
MEMBERS OF THE "PUBLIC" FOR PURPOSES OF SATISFYING 
THE DEDICATION STATUTE. 
The State and Utah County argue that uthe court of appeals 
correctly affirmed the trial court in deeming users of the Bennie 
Creek Road members of the public." See Brief of Respondent Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources, pp. 11-17.x Thoughtful 
consideration of the practical and legal effects underlying the 
court of appeals' interpretation of law in conjunction with the 
record, matters of sound public policy, and principles of equity 
demonstrate otherwise.2 
1In support of its argument, the State cites to Villadsen v. 
Mason County Rd. Comm'n, 706 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), a 
dedication case out of the court of appeals of Michigan. The State, 
however, neglects to mention that the Michigan Supreme Court, on 
review, affirmed on other grounds based on the theory of an express 
dedication. By so doing, the Michigan Supreme Court essentially 
nullified the court of appeals' reasoning upon which the State 
relies. See Villadsen v. Mason County Rd. Comm'n, 713 N.W.2d 770 
(Mich. 2006), cert, denied, 127 S.Ct. 1911 (2007). 
2The State of Utah and Utah County, throughout their Briefs, 
strenuously assert that there is a marshaling requirement with which 
Petitioners failed to comply. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources, p. 12 n.2, p. 19; see, e.g., Brief of 
Respondent Utah County, pp. 16-18. By way of the well-established 
standard of review for cases on writ of certiorari, this Court does 
not review the trial court's decision but instead reviews the 
decision of the court of appeals, which it does so for correctness. 
See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^15, 144 P.3d 1101; see also Harper 
v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 1fl0, 26 P. 3d 193 (citing State ex rel. 
M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, %8, 12 P.3d 80). Both the State and the 
1 
Contrary to the assertions of the State and Utah County, the 
record on appeal demonstrates that a substantial number, if not 
most, of the governments' witnesses utilized at trial were 
trespassers on Petitioners' property (see, e.g., R. 1639:39:7-12; 
R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; 
R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 
1642:709:16). The Petitioners, as landowners, among other things, 
diligently posted "no trespassing" signs (see, e.g., id.), placed 
gates across the road (see, e.g., R. 1642:710:18), and called the 
county sheriff to have trespassers removed (see, e.g., R. 
1645:1073:11-17). Consequently, the dedication and abandonment of 
Petitioners7 property to the public use, in effect, rewarded the 
wrongful conduct and unlawful entry upon Petitioners' property.3 
Based on a totality of the underlying circumstances in the 
instant case, most of the witnesses utilized by both the State and 
County concede as much in their statement of the issues presented and 
the applicable standards of review section of their respective 
Briefs. See Brief of Respondent Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
pp. 2-4; Brief of Respondent Utah County, pp. 1-2. 
3uThe essential element of trespass is physical invasion of the 
land; v [t]respass is a possessory action.'" Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. 
La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John Price 
Assocs., Inc. v. Utah State Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 
615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980) and citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 158 (1977)); see also Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 
(Utah 1984) . Trespass constitutes a "wrongful entry . . . upon the 
lands of another." See O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38 
Utah 475, 479, 114 P. 127, 128 (1911) . 
2 
Utah County were trespassers. Their status of wrongdoers, under 
the law, should not and did not place into the category of members 
of the public for purposes of establishing dedication and 
abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public use pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. By refusing to apply common law 
trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104, the court of appeals misinterpreted and misapplied the 
requisite elements underlying the Dedication Statute. 
According to the court of appeals' opinion, Petitioners' 
proposed interpretation would render the 
Dedication Statute ineffective because no use 
could ever constitute public use. To give the 
Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that 
nonpermissive use must be considered public use. 
We therefore agree with the trial court that 
trespassers are members of the ^public" for 
purposes of determining whether the Dedication 
Statute has been satisfied. 
Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, fll, 147 P.3d 963 
(citation omitted). The court of appeals' determination is 
seriously flawed for a number of reasons. First, it equates 
nonpermissive use as one and same with trespassing. Cf. Chapman 
v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App 383, %2, 81 P. 3d 761 (noting 
testimony of public use of road year-around, without permission 
and without encountering "restrictions"). In light of the court 
of appeals' reasoning, it is difficult to imagine the 
3 
circumstances under which a property owner could prevent the 
dedication and abandonment of his or her property. 
Second, dedication and abandonment of private property to the 
public use is established when a highway or road is continuously 
used by members of the public as a public thoroughfare for the 
requisite period of time. These elements imply at least a good 
faith use of the highway by the public. Trespassers in no way 
constitute good faith users. Instead, they come to the court with 
unclean hands based upon their wrongful conduct of invading 
another's property. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 
P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) (distinguishing between members of the 
general public and those considered to be trespassers); accord 
Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 350 So.2d 896 (La. 1977) (holding that public authority 
is precluded from taking road unless landowner knowingly 
acquiesced in public use and maintenance, amounting to tacit 
dedication by landowner). 
If the court of appeals' decision is allowed to stand, it 
would reward the unlawful and wrongful conduct of trespassing upon 
another's property. Moreover, the decision would penalize a 
landowners diligent efforts to protect his or her property within 
the parameters of the law. Consequently, the court of appeals' 
decision is contrary to the equitable principles underlying the 
4 
instant case. See Park v. Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1, 3 
(1961) (recognizing that a plaintiff must come to equity with 
clean hands). "In other words, a party who seeks an equitable 
remedy must have acted in good faith and not in violation of 
equitable principles." Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, f7, 95 P.3d 
1221. Because the use by trespassers is based upon wrongful 
conduct and a lack of good faith, equitable principles and public 
policy dictate that they are not members of the public for 
purposes of the Dedication Statute. 
Further, by refusing to apply trespassing principles to the 
requisite elements of dedication, the court of appeals 
impermissibly relieved Utah County and the State of their burden 
to prove dedication by clear and convincing evidence. As a 
result, the court of appeals allowed the burden of proof to shift 
to Petitioners, as landowners, to prove otherwise. Draper City, 
888 P.2d at 1099; Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). The court of appeals' refusal to apply the 
law of trespass also ignored the well-established presumption to 
be employed in favor of property owners, which is to be applied 
due to the high-degree of sanctity and respect of property 
ownership. Cf. Draper City, 888 P. 2d at 1099; Campbell, 962 P. 2d 
at 808. Not only did the court of appeals fail to take the 
aforementioned legal principles into consideration, it failed to 
5 
recognize the equitable nature of the instant case. See Leo M. 
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 
1981) (citing Conner v. Heaton, 205 Ark. 269, 136 S.W.2d 399 
(1943)). This further demonstrates the erroneous nature of the 
court of appeals determination. See Levin, 2 006 UT 50 at fl5, 144 
P. 3d 1101 (correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns, in 
part, on whether the court utilized the proper standard of 
review) .4 
II • THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD 
HAD BEEN CONTINUOUSLY USED AS A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE AS REQUIRED BY THE DEDICATION 
STATUTE. 
The State and Utah County argue that the court of appeals 
correctly ruled that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously 
used by the public. See Brief of Respondent State Division of 
Wildlife Resources, pp. 18-28. The record demonstrates otherwise. 
Before a private road can be taken and dedicated for public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, three elements must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence: "'there must be (i) 
4Neither the State nor Utah County address the equitable nature 
of dedication cases such as the instant case. Consequently, based on 
Utah County's own reasoning set forth in its Brief, this constitutes 
a "confession that [Petitioners'] position is correct . . . or . . . 
that the issue has merit." 5 Am Jur. 2d Appellate Review, § 555; 
Nance v. Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 82 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005); see also Bulova Watch Co. v. Super City Dept. Stores, Inc., 4 
Ariz.App. 553, 422 P.2d 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 
6 
continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
of ten years.'" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997)). In sum, "under the continuous use 
requirement, members of the public must have been able to use the 
road whenever they found it necessary or convenient." Campbell, 
962 P.2d at 809. 
In the case at bar, the district court conceded that use of 
the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally occurring 
conditions such as groundwater (spring water) in wet years and 
snow in the winter." (R. 1470), that "there were locked gates on 
. — . ~ -t 
the road." (R. 1469), and that "[t]here was testimony regarding 
four gates on the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S. Highway 89 
and the Uintah National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis added). The 
district court further stated, "Virgil Neeves testified that 
between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner 
home (the last home traveling west toward the forest service 
property, now occupied by [Petitioner] Randy Butler) which was 
locked most of the time." (R. 1467-68) .5 In addition to the 
5The district court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck 
on the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars." 
Without explanation, the district court refused to consider this 
testimonial evidence, deeming it as "simply confused and inconsistent 
with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the road in 
question." (R. 1468). 
7 
gates, the trial court conceded that there "was substantial 
testimony about ["no trespassing"] signs along the road" and other 
locations "designating the area as private property." (R. 1466; 
see also R. 1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 
1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; 
R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 1642:709:16). 
Travel by way of the Bennie Creek Road to the Forest Service 
land was not only interrupted but precluded by what was commonly 
referred to as a bog in the road, which was the result of springs 
or ditches (R. 1462) . According to the record, this bog made 
travel on the Bennie Creek Road difficult, if not impossible, 
during "certain seasons or certain times between 1925 and 1980" 
(R. 1462) . 
Moreover, unrebutted testimony provided at trial established 
that the road "is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road 
becomes impassable." (R. 1466) .6 The testimony established that 
the road was used from 1950 through 1993 as the irrigation ditch 
to transport water to the property owners' pastures on both sides 
of the road (R. 1644:944:17-25; R. 1644:970:6-9). According to 
the testimony at trial, "about every three weeks" the road would 
6The irrigation practices of the landowners were performed 
pursuant to "diligence rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:1-
4) . 
8 
be utilized for irrigation purposes w[f]or approximately six days" 
at a time (R. 1644:974:11-20). 
With total disregard for the foregoing, the trial court found 
that "neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families 
used that method or irrigation covering a period from 1925 to 
1981." (R. 1466; R. 1518, Hl8) . The State failed to rebut 
Petitioners' marshaling or the supporting argument, demonstrating 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's finding is so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making it clearly erroneous. 
The district court misinterpreted the Dedication Statute and 
misapplied the underlying legal principles of the statute 
pertaining to the elements of "continuous use" as a "public 
thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in 
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare. Moreover, 
the court of appeals erred by basing its conclusion upon that of 
the district court, which failed to consider that the 
aforementioned circumstances precluded the public from accessing 
the road "as often as they found it convenient or necessary." See 
AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, ^11, 112 P.3d 1228.7 
7Neither the State nor Utah County rebutted Petitioners' argument 
that the trial court and the court of appeals, in direct 
contravention of the underlying elements of dedication, failed to 
identify a specific ten-year period of continuous use. The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court's impermissible shifting of the 
9 
III. CONTRARY TO UTAH COUNTY'S UNSUPPORTED ASSERTIONS, 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE 
STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 72-7-104 ARE AUTOMATIC, AND THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT HAS NO DISCRETION IN AWARDING SUCH DAMAGES. 
Based on a theory that is contrary to principles of statutory 
interpretation, Utah County argues that the word "may", as plainly 
utilized by the Legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, does not 
grant any discretion to the trial court in awarding statutory 
damages. See Brief of Respondent Utah County, pp. 25-30. Utah 
County's argument is without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides: 
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, 
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains 
any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, 
conduit, sewer, ditch culvert, outdoor advertising 
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind 
or character within the right-of-way of any 
highway without complying with this title, the 
highway authority having jurisdiction over the 
right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-
of way or require the person, firm, or 
corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, 
firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation from the right-of-way. 
burden of proof to Petitioners, as landowners. Cf. Leo M. 
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 
1981) (quoting Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 
648 (1966) ) . This failure also ignored the presumption to be 
employed in favor of the Petitioners, as landowners. Id. The trial 
court's refusal to pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time of 
continuous use was an impermissible effort to shift the burden of 
such a determination to the court of appeals, as a depository in 
which the burden and determination is then to be performed. 
10 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) (2001) (emphasis added).8 
Subsection (4) further provides that "[a] highway authority may 
recover: (1) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the 
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; 
and (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the 
right-of-way after notice was complete." See Utah Code Ann. § 72-
7-104(4) (2001) (emphasis added). 
Utah case law dictates that the appellate court's ''primary 
goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative 
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Foutz v. City of S. 
Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 1(11, 100 P. 3d 1171 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In the course of interpreting a statute, the appellate 
court "presume[s] that the legislature used each word advisedly 
and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, %9, 977 P.2d 479 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Only when a statute is 
ambiguous does the appellate court look to other interpretive 
tools such as legislative history. See Adams v. Swensen, 2 005 UT 
8, f8, 108 P.3d 725. 
8A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001) is 
attached to the Brief of Petitioners as Addendum E. 
11 
The court of appeals, in the instant case, held that the 
district court "did not have discretion to deny statutory damages" 
pursuant to the statute. Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 
1(21, 147 P. 3d 963. Such a position is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute, where the Legislature utilized the 
permissive term "may" throughout various subsections of the 
statute.9 See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1), (4), and (5)(b). 
By adopting the court of appeals7 interpretation, this Court 
would have to insert the mandatory term "shall" into the statute, 
which is contrary to the legislative intent of the statute. By 
employing the permissive term "may" in contrast to the compulsory 
term "shall", the Legislature specifically intended and thereby 
enabled the court to exercise discretion in awarding the statutory 
damages provided for in the statute. Such an interpretation does 
not render the statute superfluous or inoperative, rather it 
provides the district court with the discretion to more fully 
consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the structure. 
A critical example of the trial court's discretion is 
demonstrated by its taking into consideration the fact that Utah 
County, itself, placed a sign on the gate, which reads, "KEEP 
9See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, flO, 150 P.3d 540 (discussing 
the permissive term "may" in contrast to the compulsory term "shall" 
in the course of statutory interpretation). 
12 
GATE CLOSED - PRIVATE PROPERTY TO FOREST SERVICE BOUNDARY - NO 
TRESPASSING OFF ROAD." (R. 1648: Defendants' Exhibit 80C. --
Photo of Utah County's Sign)10 Utah County's placement of the sign 
demonstrates, at the very least, acquiescence in installation of 
the gate not to mention its closure across the road. 
An interpretation that allows the trial court to exercise 
discretion in awarding damages is consistent with this being a 
case in equity. See Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 
949 (Utah 1977). "[E]quity cases afford courts discretion and 
latitude in fashioning equitable remedies." Hughes v. Cafferty, 
2004 UT 22, 1[24, 89 P. 3d 148. "A court acting in equity is not 
required to recite its decision in terms of specific factors or to 
adhere to formulaic tests. Rather, its obligation is to 
effectuate a result that serves equity given the overall facts and 
circumstances of the individual case." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
Brief of Petitioners, Petitioners respectfully ask that this Court 
reverse both the court of appeals' determination that the Bennie 
Creek Road was abandoned and dedicated to the public use and the 
10Utah County stipulated that it had placed the sign on the 
closed gate (R. 1645:1139-40). A true and correct copy of 
Defendants' Exhibit 80C is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
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conclusion that Utah County was automatically entitled to 
statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Petitioners 
further request that the Court, in the course of its reversal, 
issue a clear and concise statement of the requisite legal 
principles and elements for dedication and abandonment of a 
private road to the public use as well as principles governing 
§ 72-7-104 damages for failing to remove an installation within 
the right-of-way of a highway. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JQ day /53N July, 2007 
AgNQLD \ WIGGINS, P.C. 
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No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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